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Abstract How are we to understand the fact that the
philosophical debate over nanotechnologies has been
reduced to a clash of seemingly preprogrammed
arguments and counterarguments that paralyzes all
rational discussion of the ultimate ethical question of
social acceptability in matters of nanotechnological
development? With this issue as its starting point, the
study reported on here, intended to further compre-
hension of the issues rather than provide a cause-and-
effect explanation, seeks to achieve a rational grasp of
what is being said through the appeals made to this or
that principle in the range of arguments put forward in
publications on the subject. We present the results of
the study’s analyses in two parts. In the first, we lay
out the seven categories of argument that emerged
from an analysis of the literature: the arguments based
on nature, dignity, the good life, utility, equity,
autonomy, and rights. In the second part, we present
the background moral stances that support each
category of argument. Identifying the different cate-
gories of argument and the moral stance that underlies
each category will enable a better grasp of the reasons
for the multiplicity of the arguments that figure in
discussions of the acceptability of nanotechnologies
and will ultimately contribute to overcoming the
tendency towards talking past each other that all too
often disfigures the exchange. Clarifying the implica-
tions of the moral arguments deployed in the debate
over nanotechnologies may make it possible to reduce
the confusion observable in these exchanges and
contribute to a better grasp of the reasons for their
current unproductiveness.
Keywords Acceptability.Debateonnanotechnology.
Dialogue.Interdisciplinarity.Moralarguments.
Nanoethics.Philosophyandnanotechnology.Social
acceptabilityandnanotechnology
As has been pointed out by Jean-Pierre Dupuy ([4]:
238), philosophical debate over the ethical founda-
tions of nanotechnology has become so routine that it
would be easy to simply rhyme off the arguments
regularly brought forward: ‘The same arguments are
always served up, and they are always answered with
the same counter-arguments.’ How are we to under-
stand the fact that this philosophical debate has been
reduced to a clash among seemingly preprogrammed
arguments and counterarguments that are paralyzing
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e-mail: Johane.Patenaude@USherbrooke.caall rational discussion of the ultimate ethical
question of social acceptability in matters of
nanotechnological development? The clash of
multiple moral arguments in the public arena
reflects a more basic question: that of whether
dialogue on this issue is possible, or whether, on
the contrary, we must all bid goodbye forever to
the possible co-construction of meaning about the
social acceptability of nanotechnologies.
Opting for dialogue requires that from the
outset we seek to rationally understand what is
being said through the appeals we encounter to
this or that principle in the range of arguments
advanced. This is the situation that faces philoso-
phers when they participate in interdisciplinary
research on the ethical, economical, environmental,
legal, and social aspects of the development of
nanotechnologies. How can philosophy contribute
to this interdisciplinary dialogue if all it can offer
is a clash among moral arguments? Our first
concern in establishing a dialogue is to sort out
the different stages of confusion in the ethical
debate and to identify the sources of the incom-
patibility among the arguments in question. This
analysis inquires into the types of rationality that
support the various types of moral argument. it is
thus very different than the Swiestra and Rib study
[9], in which the starting point is a consideration of
moral arguments as moral routines that clash with
each other in social life.
From this context, the present article emerges as
the product of an effort at clarification. The aim of
the article is to provide a systematic account of
the multiple moral arguments advanced in evalu-
ating the social impact of developments in nano-
technology. To this end, we first conduct a brief
overview of the threefold nature of a moral
argument. We then inventory and analyze various
categories of moral argument deployed by different
authors in evaluating nanotechnologies. This then
puts us in a position to identify the background
moral stances that support the argument categories
analyzed. Identifying the various categories of
argument and the moral stance that underlies each
will enable a better grasp of the reasons for the
mutual irreducibility of the arguments that figure
in discussions of the acceptability of nanotechnol-
ogies explains the tendency for participants in the
debate to talk past each other.
What is a Moral Argument?
‘Moral argument’ refers to a meaning structure that
supports one’s evaluation of a situation or one’s
judgment on it. A moral argument appeals to reason,
that is, to comprehensibility by others than oneself.
The appeals to rationality made by a moral argument
are of three kinds, with each kind being specific to a
different component of the argument:
a) the appeal made by the meaning of the moral
utterance;
b) the appeal made by the justification for the moral
utterance’s moral authority;
c) the appeal made by practical reason through the
application of the moral utterance to a specific
context (concrete case under discussion) .
The moral utterance makes an appeal to a moral
principle or an ethical evaluation that guides judg-
ment regarding a specific context. The distinction
between norm-based ethics and value-based ethics has
been established in applied ethics work in the context
of corporate governance and in the work of certain
francophone Canadian philosophers [6]. We apply it
here to moral utterances. A moral utterance that
appeals to a moral principle has the meaning that a
situation is to be judged by the criterion of compli-
ance with a moral principle. When a moral argument
appeals to an ethical evaluation, it makes an appeal
for judgement of a situation to be based not on
compliance with to a norm but on an assessment of
the situation as a means of actualizing a certain value
or principle.
The justification for the moral utterance’s moral
authority consists of what is invoked as the moral
utterance’s foundations. Finally, the application of the
moral utterance to a specific context consists of the
process of practical reasoning by means of which the
moral utterance is applied to the case under dis-
cussion, in order to arrive at a moral judgment or
ethical evaluation of the case.
Debate over a given moral argument may focus on
any one of these components. But a moral argument
must comprise a clear utterance of a moral principle; a
clear presentation of the foundations for that princi-
ple’s moral authority; and a process of practical
reasoning that makes it possible to pass from the
principle invoked in the moral utterance to a concrete
situation. That these three components must be
286 Nanoethics (2011) 5:285–293present is entailed by the minimum philosophical
requirement for moral argument, namely that it
constitute a rational activity going beyond the mere
invocation of a moral concept–for example, dignity–
that is then tossed about as a key word in the
discourse around the issue in question. Absent any
one of the three components, an argument cannot be
called rational. Instead, it takes on the quality of a
conviction or an ideology, that is, a stance involving
varying degrees of rationality that is accordingly
difficult to subject to discussion.
With these components as a basis for analysis, we
find that an impressive number of diverse moral
arguments are scattered through the literature on the
evaluation of nanotechnologies. Each instance of
moral evaluation seeks to measure the consequences
of nanotechnologies by deploying its own criteria. To
better assess the current state of discussion on the
matter, we undertook to identify the moral arguments
deployed in the literature on nanotechnologies and
determine the range of their diversity. The next
section describes the method we used to do this.
Methods
We first conducted a review of the literature to
identify the texts (reports, books, and articles) in
which moral arguments are deployed to support or
oppose the development of nanotechnologies. We
identified some texts found in certain reports (includ-
ing the NSF Report, 2009) dealing with the arguments
and counterarguments around the ethical issues
associated with nanotechnologies and 16 articles
published in the journal NanoEthics; as well, we ran
general key words through search engines in an effort
to canvass the broadest possible range of arguments
invoked in connection with this subject and confirm
we had reached data saturation. Once we had reached
saturation, we had a bank of 24 texts. Each was
analyzed using an analytic framework designed to
classify the arguments we had gathered. This classi-
fication was performed at several levels, including
that of the various categories of argument deployed,
so that we might extract the ‘core meaning’ of each
and their respective underlying moral stances. Using a
second level of analysis [12], we identified the main
critiques demonstrating that the limitations of these
opposed arguments risk dooming the discussion to an
impasse. Finally, a third level of analysis in our
classification process enabled us to better gauge
whether philosophical dialogue is possible regarding
the epistemological and moral impasses that form the
background to conflicts among the previously identi-
fied categories of moral argument.
In the next section, we report on the results of our
first level of classification, the one that, as explained,
reveals the multiplicity of categories of moral argu-
ment deployed and the core meaning in each. These
results rely on an analysis of the first of the three
components of a moral argument, namely the moral
utterance, as found in the texts reviewed. In the
subsequent section, based on the two other compo-
nents of a moral argument, namely the justification
for the moral utterance’s moral authority and the
application of the moral utterance to a concrete case,
we offer an account of the moral stances underlying
the various categories of moral argument.
The Categories of Argument
Analyzing the moral utterance component of moral
arguments yielded the finding that seven broad
families or categories of argument can be identified:
the arguments based on nature, dignity, the good life,
utility, equity, autonomy, and rights.
Category 1: The argument based on nature and
based on metaphysical human nature
This category of argument demands compliance
with nature: nature represents a norm that we cannot
violate without risk or that we must follow in order to
remain in harmony with it.
Core meaning: Act in accordance with nature and
make sure your actions maintain harmony with
nature. For example: ‘[N]anotechnological develop-
ments will not only transgress physical barriers in
unheard of ways, but also spiritual and moral barriers,
by clashing with a predetermined order of things.’
([7]: 119).
Category 2: The argument based on human dignity
This is the Kantian argument of human dignity,
according to which the human being must always be
viewed as an end in herself or himself and never as a
means to another thing.
Core meaning: Act in such a way that you treat
humanity ‘never merely as a means, but always at the
same time as an end’ ([5]: 33). It is this category of
argument that is referred to in these passages:
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(deontology) is … to the most fundamental questions
raised by the nanotechnological project….’ ([4]: 238);
and here: ‘The second version [of the appeal to
human dignity], that is, the invocation of the integrity,
or of the dignity, of the human being, is more delicate
to handle’ ([7]: 120).
Category 3: The argument based on the good life
Here we are dealing with the Aristotelian argument
based on the idea of the good life.
Core meaning: The ethical choice consists of
determining the kind of life we wish to live together
as human beings. For example: ‘[T]he“improvements”
advanced by the transhumanists are distant from the ideal
of the happy medium advanced by the ethics of virtues;
rather, they assume the form of what Antiquity depicted
with the disgraceful features of excess’ ([7]:117).
Category 4: The argument based on utility
This is the argument according to which the best
choice consists of the net maximization of positive
consequences over negative consequences for human
beings.
Core meaning: ‘Act in such a way that your
choices maximize positive consequences over nega-
tive consequences for the largest number of people.’
For example:
Utilitarianism, simply, defines ethical accept-
ability in terms of consequences, specifically,
positive net outcomes of actions. If an action (or
development or use of a technology) makes
more people happy, or satisfies more of the
people’s preferences, then that action is ethically
acceptable. ([2]:57)
Category 5: The argument based on equity
Under this category of argument, individuals and
groups must be treated in the same way once their
shared membership in a single reference category has
been acknowledged.
Core meaning: ‘Act in such a way that people who
are members of the same reference category are treated
in the same way.’ For example: ‘Does human enhance-
ment raise issues of fairness, access, and equity? …It is
feared by some that nanotechnology will also sharpen
and widen divisions both within societies and between
nations: a nanodivide will be created’ ([1]:21).
Category 6: The argument based on autonomy
This is the category of argument based on
complete freedom in conducting one’s life. The
ethical choice is that which an individual makes as a
self-determining subject.
Core meaning: Act according to your individual
choices. For this we have two examples. The first is
this statement by Cole (1998) as quoted by Burkhardt
([2]: 66): ‘Autonomy means self-determination, and if
our primary ethical responsibility is to respect self-
determination then individual preferences or choices
cannot be written off or ignored for the sake of the
maximum good.’ Burkhardt continues in his own
voice, ‘In fact, according to the rights/autonomy
principle, any “social good” has to be defined as
providing or allowing individuals the freedom to
chose. This freedom includes the freedom to avoid
[genetically modified] foods for whatever reasons the
individual sees fit.’ ([2]: 66)
Category 7: The argument based on rights
According to this category of argument, in a liberal
democracy, self-determination must be considered a
fundamental right and serves as the basis for legal
responsibility.
Core meaning: ‘Act according to your individual
choices and within the limits of existing laws.’ For
example: ‘Accordingly, there can be no trade-off, no
“balancing,” no calculating net gains. Even though an
action may achieve utilitarian gains, or serve some
greater social good, if individuals have certain rights
against that action, it is wrong.’ [2]
There is, then, a significantly wide range of moral
utterances about nanotechnologies, which, when they
are analyzed based on their core meanings, can be
reduced to the seven categories of moral argument
presented above. Furthermore, each of the seven
categories of argument claims normative force (to
forbid or to authorize) or puts forward a criterion for
evaluation with which to judge acceptability (good/
bad) and each constitutes its own universe of
meaning, one that cannot be reduced to the universe
of meaning of any of the others.
The two other components of a moral argument,
namely the justification for the moral utterance’s
moral authority and the application of the moral
utterance to a concrete case, reveal with greater
precision the irreducible nature of the moral stances
underlying each of these seven categories of argu-
ment. It is not hard to clarify the first dimension of the
mutual irreducibility of these arguments : it resides in
the background epistemological positions to the moral
arguments deployed. Thus the arguments based on
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knowledge of nature, human nature, or the human
condition and postulate that such knowledge is
possible. Advancing a different approach to rational-
ity than that of moral knowledge are the moral
arguments based on utility and equity, which rest on
an evaluation of a specific case. Finally, some argu-
ments do not recognize a moral foundation other than
individual or social choices. The argument based on
autonomy, when it is not founded on the existence of
a human nature, is integrated into the arguments
based on rights. These arguments are based on social
choices to be made without reference to a moral
background and thus they shift from philosophy to
politics.
Let us take a closer look at these various epistemo-
logical stances.
Background Epistemological Stances to the Moral
Arguments
Stance 1: Nature and Metaphysical Human Nature
In moral arguments that deploy the principle of the
knowledge of nature and human nature, the moral
utterances with which nanotechnologies are evaluated
consist of a prescription. The moral utterance speci-
fies what we must or must not do, based on what we
know of the laws that govern nature and our human
nature. The whole of the rational justification that
serves as the basis for the moral prescription’s
authority consists of our capacity to understand these
laws inscribed in nature and our own human nature. It
is, in fact, knowledge of these laws that enables us to
understand our obligations. Under this type of moral
justification, it is human membership in nature or in
the human species that makes it possible, thanks to
the transcendence of laws over individuals and to the
feeling of belonging, to mobilize individuals to act in
compliance with moral rules.
A p p l i c a t i o no ft h i sp r e s c r i p t i o nt oac o n c r e t e
situation requires practical reasoning consisting of
recognizing that such-and-such an action in such-and-
such a context represents an instance of deviation
from what the moral prescription would stipulate.
Thus practical reasoning would appear to consist
essentially of identifying the type of action involved
in a situation and comparing it with all the possible
actions that could violate the moral prescription
logically or formally.
Stance 2: Human Nature (a Priori Conditions
for Moral Experience)
In moral arguments of the Kantian type, we find a
moral prescription that expresses the condition for
possibility of our moral actions. This prescription is
very general and is aimed essentially at identifying
the relationship we should have with other human
beings. According to Robert Theis ([10]: paragraphs
20 and 23), it is this formulation of the categorical
imperative that constitutes the center of gravity for the
various ways the principle has been framed: ‘Act in
such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your
own person or in the person of any other, never
merely as a means to an end, but always at the same
time as an end’ ([5]: 30). This command, ‘Act’,
concerns how we orient our ability to act. It is the
universal nature of humanity as an end in itself, as
found within oneself and others, that the prescription
sets as transcendent. To the extent that the Kantian
approach is designed to address the limitations of
metaphysical knowledge, moral justification here is
based on transcendental inquiry. Whereas we cannot
have access to knowledge of things in themselves, to
‘the real’, we can have access to knowledge of what
makes possible our experience of knowledge, or our
moral experience. Transcendental inquiry, then,
makes it possible to identify these conditions for
possibility of our experience. The categorical imper-
ative is the result of transcendental analysis of the will
to act morally. For Kant, moral action is distinguished
from acting according to one’s desires, and the
objective moral end of the human being is distin-
guished from the subjective end linked to the desire
for happiness. Theis ([10]: paragraph 41) specifies:
‘Ends can be subjective or objective. A subjective end
concerns the individual and is a function of some
object of the individual’s faculty for desiring: it
constitutes a motive. On the other hand, an objective
end is universal and constitutes a determining
principle of the will as will. As such, an objective
end is a duty. Moral law constitutes just such an end.’
While the categorical imperative stipulates the
ultimate nature of the human being as an end in
herself or himself and the prohibition against treating
the human being only as a means, the work of Kant
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for evaluating choices such as those related to the
development of nanotechnologies. It is possible that
practical questions, such as that of lying or the
possibility of disposing of one’s own body as one
wishes, will in fact find answers in the prescription to
treat human beings as ends in themselves; but when it
comes to other activities, in order to take the human
being into account, we are obliged to establish a
whole series of causal links among the various
possible uses of nanotechnologies and the impacts of
these uses on human beings.
Stance 3: The Good Life
The epistemological foundations for evaluating nano-
technologies by reference to the good life are very
different from the foundations for reference to the
good life presented by Aristotle, the first philosopher
to articulate this concept as a basis for the moral
evaluation of human action. While in Aristotle there
existed a moral obligation for all human beings to act
in accordance with their natures, this obligation
imposed on human beings the need to make choices
that would actualize their human potential. Thus the
Aristotelian foundations relate more to arguments
about human nature than to questions of the human
condition. Post-Kantian moral philosophy must reflect
human morality beyond the foundations given by
nature and must also take into account the limitations
of Kantian transcendental inquiry into human dignity.
Arguments based on the concept of the good life seek
to evaluate human choices according to their con-
sequences for human life, from both an individual
point of view and a social one. In Paul Ricoeur
([1990] [8]: 172), we find, as part of his celebrated
definition of the purpose of ethics, the element of
individual choice focused on happiness, but taking
into account the other and institutions: ‘aiming at the
“good life” with and for others, in just institutions’.
What distinguishes an approach of this kind from
Aristotle’s is the fact that the aim of ethics is not
rooted in nature but is based rather on our human
condition and the work of civilization. The moral
justification for approaches based on the good life
rests essentially on the moral experience of human
beings through history. This ethos, which is based on
failures and successes, leads us, by means of inquiry,
to pinpoint a basis in collective experience, which
serves to guide us in our future choices. While we are
the product of history, we are also responsible for the
history that is to come. Tradition serves as a guide,
but, in the light of new experiences, it must reflect on
itself and think itself in context. A sense of human
experience through history—a strong sense of tradi-
tion–influences the choices that will have an impact
on our future, because it constitutes the basis for what
transcends our individual natures. Case-based reason-
ing makes it possible to apply the process of
evaluation of the good life to a particular context.
This evaluation of what is acceptable or not first
requires knowledge of the consequences of choices
for human life and then an evaluation of these
consequences in light of the impact of the choices in
question on our human condition. The more these
changes distance us from our traditional ways and
transform our individual and social living conditions,
the more negative will be the evaluation. Our human
condition, as it results from the collective history of
humanity, thus makes it possible to establish certain
guidelines for evaluating future paths according to
their implications for the human condition.
Stance 4: Value-Based Moral Evaluation
The main form taken by the utilitarian moral argu-
ments advanced to evaluate nanotechnologies is far
different from the moral theory of John Stuart Mill or
Jeremy Bentham. It comes down to an economic
version of cost-benefit analysis. The locus of conver-
gence of this analysis with utilitarian morality does
not reside in the moral obligation to increase the
general well-being of the largest number, but rather in
performing an evaluation by means of a calculation of
the cost of a given development. An accounting-style
balance of costs and benefits is viewed as making
possible the determination of the rational choice. The
main criticisms made in response to this basis for
argument raises the problem inherent in general
formulations of a judgment value: ‘What is a cost?’,
‘What is a benefit?’ The fact is, the moral evaluation
must judge the value to be ascribed to consequences
in light of the evaluative category. Is such-and-such a
consequence useful? Does such-and-such a conse-
quence represent a cost? Is such-and-such a conse-
quence a benefit? And how are we to keep these two
evaluations in relationship with each other? ([9]: 12)
To provide the practical reasoning which will serve as
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specify the general value by assigning more precise
criteria; and, from a philosophical perspective, it is
necessary to justify what the choice of criteria is
based on. Mill’s moral philosophy rests on an analysis
of human moral experience, just as does Kant’s,
although not with a view to determining a transcen-
dental structure, but essentially with a practical goal
of determining what human beings seek as well-being
by virtue of being human. In contrast to Mill, who
sought to identify that which is proper to human
beings in order to define utility, economics-based
thinking proposes that we should consider every value
in light of the quest to maximize personal happiness.
With utilitarian evaluation, it is in the sphere of
application that difficulties emerge. The first difficulty
often relates to the level of generality of the criterion
to apply. The second is rooted in the difficulty of
identifying consequences. Not all consequences are
evident. The debate over human toxicity already
provides an example of this difficulty in the sphere
of science. What is to be done when we consider
social consequences? How are we to determine these
consequences? In other words, how will the utilitarian
analysis be able to take account of uncertainty in
producing its balance sheet?
Another category of argument, that of equity, also
rests on moral evaluation. Like utilitarian arguments,
arguments based on equity claim that we cannot
accept something socially if it does not satisfy equity-
based criteria. It may seem surprising to place
utilitarianism and equity on the same footing, because
the work done by Rawls appears to many to be a
fundamental critique of utilitarianism. The resem-
blance between the two resides in the way the moral
utterances are structured. In both cases, it’s a question
of evaluating consequences. The difference resides in
the specific nature of the evaluation. Whereas in
utilitarianism evaluation is done by people involved
in social life in order to determine what is most useful
to the greatest number, in Rawls’s analysis, whether
it’s a question of individual or collective decisions,
rational rules are to be established as the basis for
social choices within a democratic society. Utilitari-
anism is reproached with producing decisions that in
reality may sacrifice some individuals or groups for
the benefit of the majority: Rawls seeks to establish a
theory of collective decision making that allows for
avoiding such a sacrifice of some in favor of others.
The argument based on equity has Kantian overtones,
but it is built on a collective and not an individual
basis.
The justification for Rawls’s moral theory rests on
the bases found within the English-speaking tradition,
namely those of reflection on moral experience.
Rawls calls this process ‘reflective equilibrium’:i t
consists of reflecting on our practices and our
conflicts in moral judgment on the basis of our sense
of justice, in order to arrive at a balance among
various beliefs and ensure consistent action is taken.
In applying this process to democracy, Rawls sees
that one way of ensuring such a sense of justice is to
place the humans who are to decide on a constitution
under a veil of ignorance. Thus no single person
knows what position she or he will occupy in society.
It is by eliminating personal interests and personal
attitudes and beliefs that the rule of equity can be
formulated.
As with utilitarianism, the application of evaluation
on the basis of equity requires a case-by-case
approach. ‘[S]uch an approach should deal with
ethical issues in their real-world context rather than
taking them as abstract ethical issues that can be
solved by applying existing ethical concepts and
theories’ ([11]: 34). However, we must never forget
that this principle can only be applied to situations
involving social distribution. It is no surprise that it
tends to be questions of equitable distribution of the
windfalls of nanotechnology that bring this argument
into play.
Stance 5: Moral Subjectivism
The first four bases for moral argument assume the
existence of a dimension that transcends individuals
and subsumes them, whether by means of natural law,
or by the fact of membership in the human race, or in
virtue of accumulated human experience through
history and within institutions. Thanks to this tran-
scendent element, it is possible to identify obligations
that we have in both our individual and our collective
lives. Moral subjectivism declares that every morality
is individual and every individual choice must be
respected because the only moral authority is the
subject. It recognizes no transcendental dimension as
serving as a guide to moral action.
Moral subjectivism rests essentially on a psycho-
social approach that postulates that everything related
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is based on emotions and preferences. Thus all moral
language, even the commandment ‘Thou shalt not
kill’, is nothing more than the expression of a
negative emotion (in the instance cited here, negative
emotion in the face of murder) and the expression of a
preference for a way of living in society. Moral
judgments or declarations are no more than an
expression of approval or disapproval towards certain
behaviors. In this perspective, there thus exists no
rational or moral dimension; this is why all the
previous categories of argument are irrelevant to the
evaluation of technological development.
What is to be done in the face of the multiplicity of
individual choices, given that there is no rational means
of discussing preferences? The answer is that social
control is made possible by a theory of rights. And this
indeed is the basis in law for legal responsibility. Every
individual is liable for damages caused to another. The
Québec [3] does allow for exceptions, however:
1473. The manufacturer, distributor or supplier
of a movable property is not liable to reparation
for injury caused by a safety defect in the
property if he proves that the victim knew or
could have known of the defect, or could have
foreseen the injury.
Nor is he liable to reparation if he proves that,
according to the state of knowledge at the time
that he manufactured, distributed or supplied the
property, the existence of the defect could not
have been known, and that he was not neglect-
ful of his duty to provide information when he
became aware of the defect.
Under this approach, limitations on a person’s
rights may be contemplated solely when there exists
an already known risk, and this only according to the
knowledge that was available at the moment of
manufacture. The absolute autonomy of the subject
is bounded only when there are consequences harmful
to others. In this perspective, consequences to the
environment only take on meaning according to the
impact of the environment on individuals.
Conclusion
Analysis of the moral arguments has made it possible
to clarify their argumentative structure. This allows
for avoiding misunderstanding; for example, misun-
derstanding about the various semantic units of the
principle of human dignity when used in a Kantian
sense as opposed to a libertarian sense. Moreover, this
analysis makes it possible to show the following:
understanding the way moral arguments are irreduc-
ible to each other requires clear moral utterances
stating the principles invoked, specifics about the
basis for justification of those moral utterances’ moral
authority, and practical reasoning that enables the
passage from the moral utterance to a concrete
situation. As well, once the moral stances in the
background of the various categories of moral
argument were identified, we were able to demon-
strate what the multiplicity of the arguments
ultimately derives from.
Analysis of the moral arguments also showed the
difference between, on one hand, those moral utter-
ances that clearly specify obligations to act or
prohibitions against action, such as the arguments
based on nature and human nature, dignity, and the
good life, and, on the other hand, those that advance
principles such as utility and equity as bases for
evaluation. The analysis also showed that the argu-
ment based on autonomy only has moral implications
when associated with the argument based on rights.
These moral utterances were systematically analyzed
from the point of view of moral epistemology and that
of practical reason in order to identify what is
particular to them. It was this that brought to light
five moral stances underlying the seven categories of
argument.
These distinctions and systematic analyses are
intended to contribute to a reduction in the confusion
that is too often present in the debate over nano-
technologies. They reveal the mutually irreducible
nature of the five moral stances identified. The first
form of irreductibility resides in the possibility of
knowing moral obligations or the human condition as
a moral fact. Three different epistemological positions
are found here: the rationality of moral obligation, the
rationality of a value-based evaluation; and the
absence of rationality. The second form of irreduc-
ibility resides in the conceptions of practical reason-
ing that correspond to the epistemological positions.
It remains to understand why these irreducible
stances cannot engage in dialogue with each other. In
other words, are we condemned to talk past each
other? Before analysing the different ways of dealing
292 Nanoethics (2011) 5:285–293with the mutual irreducibility of moral arguments
such as those advanced by philosophers like Habermas
and Rawls, we must deepen our analysis of the
impasses in the dialogue on moral arguments [12].
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